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THE RUNAWAY WAGON: HOW PAST SCHOOL
DISCRIMINATION, FINANCE, AND ADEQUACY
CASE LAW WARRANTS A POLITICAL
QUESTION APPROACH TO EDUCATION
REFORM LITIGATION
Anthony Bilan*
INTRODUCTION
Courtroom battles surrounding school finance and adequacy claims are
very much alive today, nearly forty years after their progenitor, Serrano v.
Priest.1 In spawning a potential new chapter in this history, a trial court in
California struck down its state’s battalion of teacher tenure and employment
laws under a legal analysis based in the education quality that those laws provided.2 This “landmark” case, Vergara, is generating conversation that its
results could be duplicated throughout the nation.3 In a format familiar to
school finance litigation, the Vergara court found that the state’s tenure statutes so detrimentally affected teaching that education quality was unconstitutionally harmed.4 While this result may seem extreme, the history of state
education litigation, with comparisons to federal segregation litigation, shows
not only that these dramatic remedies are not surprising but also that an
application of the political question doctrine proves effective in scaling back
any policy-based court excesses. As will be argued here, then, Vergara displays
the natural conclusion of courts accepting inherently political questions as
admissible claims.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016. I would like to thank
my instructor, Professor Nicole Garnett, for her thoughtful suggestions and helpful
discussions, which were instrumental to this Note’s development. I would also like to
thank Professor Peter Karsten in whose undergraduate seminar I learned to read the law.
Any oversights are solely the responsibility of the author.
1 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
2 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 15–16 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014).
3 Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-tenure-laws-ruled-un
constitutional.html (noting that the case could “prompt challenges to tenure laws in other
states”).
4 Vergara, slip op. at 9–10.
1225
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Part I of this Note, after a brief introduction to the political question
doctrine, outlines relevant school segregation case law and follows up with a
history of school finance and adequacy litigation. Part II discusses the patterns and parallels formed by these two areas of law, with particular attention
focused on the choices and consequences of judicial decisions under the
rubric of the political question doctrine. Part III introduces a few recent
additions to the history of school finance litigation, with particular focus on
Vergara. Part IV discusses these recent cases in light of the analysis in Part II.
Part IV particularly considers how recent school finance litigation resembles
the character of federal discrimination cases before limiting principles were
installed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Furthermore, Part IV discusses how
cases like Vergara are the logical conclusion of not applying political question
concerns to school finance claims. Ultimately, courts ought to make a universal reference to the political question doctrine as a controlling principle
for decisions in school adequacy litigation.
I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS: FROM SCHOOL DISCRIMINATION
TO SCHOOL FINANCE
The political question doctrine is a branch of nonjusticiability, which
acts as a restriction on court authority to accept claims. This jurisdictional
bar has developed as a response to concerns that courts were rendering judgments in the area of public policy. The federal political question doctrine
seeks to remove issues from court supervision that by their nature are better
left to the cognizance of another branch of government.5 While it is true
that state courts are under no obligation to accept federal instruction on
justiciability, many state courts have adopted and applied the federal political
question factors as enunciated in Baker v. Carr.6 The political question doctrine prevents judges from using limited courtroom tools to fashion remedies
that overturn or compel new legislation. Otherwise, judges may be utilizing
testimony limited to selected experts in order to change policies originally
crafted by the representative legislature. Additionally, the political question
doctrine contemplates that there are certain issues where policy and law are
5 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Political question[s] . . . [are] essentially a
function of the separation of powers.”). The critical factors are
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 46, 129, 133 (discussing applications of Baker by
state courts).
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so intermingled that the question simply becomes unfit for judicial resolution. When judges try to resolve these deep, policy-based issues in a courtroom, high emotion may generate “bad law.”7 Worse yet, as courts proceed
to resolve cases that are actually policy questions, judicial power shakes off its
definitive boundaries.
By way of introduction, political question issues in education law
emerged from attempts at education reform where advocates, frustrated with
the legislative process, sought to use courts to enforce their policy goals.8
Although reformers initially succeeded in the segregation context, the difficulties in controlling this policy-oriented litigation compelled the U.S.
Supreme Court to limit federal authority in discrimination cases partially
through use of political question principles. Similar to this, the various waves
of school finance and adequacy litigation produced startlingly differing
results depending on whether the political question doctrine was imposed or
not. States accepting the political question doctrine resemble later, muted
segregation litigation, while states admitting school finance litigation have
struggled against the problems that motivated the political question shift in
segregation litigation. As discussed in detail later, Vergara and other current
cases reveal the very real and current continuing egregious results of courts
persisting in admitting the inherently political questions of school finance
litigation.
A.

The Expansion and Contraction of Discrimination Litigation
in the Federal Courts

Federal court involvement in school desegregation begins with Brown v.
Board of Education.9 This Note only considers a few narrow aspects of the
celebrated Brown decision and does not quarrel with—or analyze—its central
holding. Rather, the focus here is on the evidence applied to the Brown decision and the consequent legacy of broad judicial remedies and oversight that
the Brown decision ultimately set into motion. To depart from the
entrenched doctrine of “separate but equal” under Plessy v. Ferguson,10 the
Court utilized social science evidence, outside of traditional constitutional
analysis. Specifically, the Court held that segregated or “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and thus violate the Equal Protection
7 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment.”).
8 Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s Promise, 8 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 1, 5–6 (2002) (“[C]ourts have been important battlegrounds in the struggle for
education reform. . . . [P]laintiffs have challenged state education systems in both state and
federal courts on the basis of racial segregation, funding disparities, and overall inadequacy of schooling.”).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL309.txt

1228

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

31-MAR-16

9:52

[vol. 91:3

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, based primarily on studies suggesting
segregation generates a “sense of inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a
child to learn.”11 Of particular note is that the scientific validity of the most
influential core evidence, the doll studies conducted by Kenneth Clark, has
been criticized.12 While the justification for the inclusion of social science is
debated,13 its decisive role in the case established that scientific expert evidence could be applied to decisions surrounding education.
Brown set into motion the enormous remedial process of judicially
desegregating schools. These remedies are listed in Brown II, which, under
equity principles, empowers federal courts to inspect and alter administration, physical school condition, “the school transportation system, personnel, . . . school districts and attendance areas[,] . . . [and] local laws and
regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.”14
This naturally led to an immense transformation of the relations between
federal courts and school districts. In pursuit of a “unitary” school system,
and without clear boundaries of authority, a school in violation could find
itself compelled by a federal court to adopt racial quotas, reconfigure attendance zones, and most prominently, redraw busing routes.15 When one federal court doubted its jurisdiction to utilize its powers, since only a part of a
school district was found to be segregated, the U.S. Supreme Court lowered
the bar and required only that a “substantial portion” of a school district be
segregated to merit the full force of federal court equity jurisdiction.16 On
the side of litigants, private plaintiffs, backed by special interests like the
NAACP, pushed for expansive remedies and played strong roles in determining what the eventual court-ordered remedy would consist of, particularly
with regard to consent decrees.17 With increased federal oversight of schools
via the federal courts and a growing list of possible remedies, judges found
themselves increasingly in management roles over local school districts.18
11 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (quoting Transcript of Record at 246, Brown, 347 U.S.
483 (No. 1)).
12 See John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215,
217 n.9 (1998) (noting that the doll study contained many uncontrolled variables and its
results were “worse than indeterminate” in being contrary to the Court’s findings).
13 For an interpretation that the Court sought to better legitimize its decision by using
social science, see David K. Cohen & Janet A. Weiss, Social Science and Social Policy: Schools
and Race, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72, 79 (Ray C. Rist &
Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977).
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955).
15 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971).
16 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973).
17 See Randolph D. Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1813–14, 1813 n.14 (1986) (discussing the strength of privately litigated remedies, including one argued by the NAACP, compared with more
anemic remedies negotiated by the U.S. Government over the same period).
18 John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of
the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1135 (1996) (“Thus, from its beginnings in the
school desegregation cases, the judiciary’s equitable remedial authority ha[d] expanded to
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In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first opinion signaling a
course change from its previous track on school desegregation cases. Milliken v. Bradley trimmed federal court remedial power toward school segregation19 and notably was the first time the Court had rejected a position of the
NAACP on desegregation.20 Specifically, the Court cautioned against district
courts acting in the role of “de facto ‘legislative authorit[ies]’” and “school
superintendent[s]” in restructuring state educational laws, viewing that as “a
task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would
deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives.”21 In another case, based heavily on academic expert testimony and
social science, the Court permitted a district court to impose compensatory
education programs, in-service training programs, and guidance counseling
programs as part of a desegregation plan.22 However, once again, the Court
curtailed the new judicial reach in Missouri v. Jenkins where it reversed a district court remedy to increase faculty salaries on grounds that it went beyond
the court’s intradistrict remedial power.23 The district court had grounded
its authority on a “desegregative attractiveness” theory; however, according to
the Court, this theory could justify any increased expenditure with no “objective limitation” and thus be a “hook on which to hang numerous policy
choices about improving the quality of education in general.”24
Justice Thomas, concurring with the 5-4 majority, would more clearly
enunciate the political question issues that Jenkins evoked. He refuted the
ability of federal judges to make “fundamentally political decisions as to
which priorities [were] to receive funds and staff, which educational goals are
to be sought, and [what] values are to be taught” since in doing so “they
detract from the independence and dignity of the federal courts and intrude

the point where federal courts in some instances ha[d] replaced state and local officials as
the managers of state institutions.”).
19 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (requiring “racially discriminatory acts of the state or local
school districts . . . [as] a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation” before ordering an
interdistrict remedy).
20 MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 432–33 (5th ed. 2012).
21 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 743–44.
22 Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 267, 272 (1977); see also Betsy Levin,
School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 30–33 (1978) (explaining that the Court affirmed these remedies based on extensive
testimony that desegregation plans may require such educational components to achieve
an adequate remedy).
23 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995).
24 Id. at 98–99 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Prior to the case, the district court’s “desegregative attractiveness”
plan had resulted in per-pupil expenditures far exceeding, perhaps even doubling, that of
surrounding suburban schools. Id. at 99. Among other amenities, district high schools
contained a twenty-five acre farm, a planetarium, a temperature-controlled art gallery, a
diesel mechanics room, and an editing and animation lab. Id. at 79.
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into areas in which they have little expertise.”25 The limiting, political question-oriented tone of cases like Jenkins and Milliken has endured in federal
school discrimination law today.26
Around the time of Milliken, education reformers were launching a new
offensive in California, spawning the progeny of cases known as school
finance litigation. Though it was not based on discrimination law, this litigation would raise the same political question issues noted above. School
finance litigation, like discrimination litigation, faced the same problems
associated with courts attempting to answer political questions: the limits of
court expert testimony and evidence, focused interest group influence, and
over-expansive court power. Predictably, just as the U.S. Supreme Court provided limits on discrimination law, some state courts likewise curtailed school
finance claims. However, for courts admitting causes of action under that
litigation, the plethora of cases in their jurisdictions prove all the more that a
political question approach should have been applied.
B.

State Diversity in School Finance Litigation

Like the advocates for racial equality in schools, education reformers
who saw disparities in quality and funding between school districts turned to
courts to seek remedies. Judges as a result began peering into the funding
systems of school districts, with California hosting the first prominent case.
Serrano v. Priest27 started as a federal equal protection case until the U.S.
Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez subsequently
rejected both a federal right to education and an application of strict scrutiny
to disparate school funding systems.28
San Antonio’s federalism-based opinion provides some kernels of wisdom
for adjudicating school finance litigation. Faced with claims described as a
“direct attack on the way . . . Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and
local tax revenues,” the Court deferred to state legislatures due to a lack of
“expertise” required to make “wise decisions” concerning tax collection and
expenditure.29 The Court further noted the divisive problems of education
policy where the judiciary’s “lack of specialized knowledge and experience
25 Id. at 132–33 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Federal courts simply cannot gather sufficient information to render an effective decree, have limited resources to induce compliance, and cannot seek political and public support for their remedies.”).
26 United States v. Mississippi, 941 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (referencing
Jenkins and Milliken in noting that “we have sometimes closed our eyes to federal judicial
overreaching, as in the context of school desegregation” (alteration in original) (quoting
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386 (1996))). The court went on to note: “However, this
Court is also well aware that ‘[r]eturning schools to the control of local authorities at the
earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental
system.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992)).
27 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
28 411 U.S. 1, 28, 37 (1973).
29 Id. at 40–41.
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counsel[ed] against” interfering with “informed” state and local judgment.30
Importantly, “[o]n even the most basic questions in this area” as general as
the connection between education expenditures and quality, “the scholars
and education experts are divided.”31 These problems of limited court
expertise—supplemented by conflicting scholarship—would prove equally
troublesome to later state litigation, although the state courts had much
more varied outcomes.
Serrano failed at the federal level but persisted to victory as a state constitutional equal protection challenge.32 Although the Vergara opinion traces
itself to Serrano, Serrano focused on education “equity” in finance rather than
“adequacy.”33 “Adequacy” principles, related to the quality aspects of Vergara, in application often result in carving judicially enforced education funding and quality requirements from substantive education guarantees in state
constitutions.34 School adequacy litigation in state courts is remarkable in its
diversity among the states35 but ultimately, as will be described, the cases
resulted either in courts taking an active role in enforcing state educational
constitutional provisions or instead holding that the claims were nonjusticiable as political questions.
When school finance litigation has been permitted to thrive, it has been
described as “sprawling, complicated, and seemingly endless.”36 Sparring
between the state legislature and judiciary over these cases has resulted in
political action to remove judges; however, “political resistance . . . has in
nearly all instances been overcome by state courts that . . . compel[ ] enact30 Id. at 42–43.
31 Id. at 42.
32 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding that equal protection principles in the state constitution require a standard of strict scrutiny, under which the school
funding scheme ultimately failed); cf. id. at 963 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (“So long as
the Legislature has operated under its constitutional authority we should withhold
intervention.”).
33 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014)
(“While these cases addressed the issue of a lack of equality of educational opportunity
based on the discrete facts raised therein, here this Court is directly faced with issues that
compel it to apply these constitutional principles to the quality of the educational
experience.”).
34 David Hinojosa & Karolina Walters, How Adequacy Litigation Fails to Fulfill the Promise
of Brown [But How It Can Get Us Closer], 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 575, 602 (“[P]laintiffs began
asserting adequacy claims under the education clauses of state constitutions as a means to
improve educational opportunities and achievement for all children.”).
35 NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 338 (6th ed. 2016) (noting
the lack of any uniformity on the part of state courts with regard to funding adequacy).
36 JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 145 (2010); see also VICTORIA J.
DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 145 (2d ed. 2010) (listing several state supreme court cases on education funding and rights). In this area of
litigation, as of 2010, New Jersey has issued at least twenty supreme court opinions, Texas
has at least four, and Idaho, California, and Connecticut each have three opinions. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL309.txt

1232

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

31-MAR-16

9:52

[vol. 91:3

ment of reform legislation.”37 While some courts, in their remedies, invalidate standing legislation and then permit the legislature to fill the breach,
other courts issue prerequisites to new education legislation. The Kentucky
Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., took upon itself the
duty to parse out in great detail the meaning of the state constitution’s
requirement to an “efficient . . . education.”38 After looking to traditional
sources of constitutional interpretation, such as founding legislative
debates—emphasizing only the importance of education—the court looked
to different experts in the academic field who each defined an “efficient”
system in their own way, including an “adequate and uniform” system with no
financial waste or hardship, a unitary system focusing on teacher pay and
school building resources, or some combination of the two.39 While the
court adopted this evidence, it rejected a countering expert school superintendent who described an “efficient” system as “one which is operated as best
as can be with the money that was provided.”40 More famously, the court
then proceeded to outline constitutionally required adequacy as “at least . . .
seven . . . capacities.”41 Amid the more vague standards were “sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex
and rapidly changing civilization,” along with “training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently.”42 Important to this discussion, evidence promulgated by interest groups played a heavy role in
influencing the court.43 The Kentucky Supreme Court is not alone in
37 John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96, 103 (Joshua M. Dunn
& Martin R. West eds., 2009).
38 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
39 Id. at 210–11 (noting that the expert definitions of “‘efficient’ were documented
and supported by numerous national and local studies, prepared and authorized by many
of the giants of the education profession”).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 212 (requiring an efficient school system to provide: “(i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental
and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts
in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market”).
42 Id.
43 See Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from School
Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 664 n.41 (2001)
(noting that the court’s adequacy requirements were a “version of the Select Committee’s
list of ‘capacities’ that a common school system should foster in all students”). The “Select

TO
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rejecting legislative deference by defining judicially enforceable education
requirements, as other courts have engaged in similar practices.44 Beyond
this, as noted above, school finance litigation generally can last for decades as
a result of continued attempts to enforce judgments.45 The struggles to find
clear standards and provide effective court enforcement have culminated in
some courts taking less active approaches to education litigation and declaring them largely nonjusticiable political questions.
As noted by the dissenters of school adequacy cases, each of the claims at
issue could have been dismissed as a political question. Indeed, dissents were
clear in stating issues of soft judicial standards and calling for more deference to the legislative branch.46 However, some states’ judiciaries have
adopted the political question position. In Committee for Educational Rights v.
Edgar, the Illinois Supreme Court held that providing judicially enforceable
content to the “efficient” education clause of the state constitution was a
political question.47 The court dismissed claims that “efficiency” implied
“equality” after looking at the original intent of the state constitution and
characterizing conflicting court analyses as an “intellectual shell game.”48
The court, in reaffirming legislative dominance on policy questions, restated
its self-prohibition against the power to “legislate in the field of public education [or] any other area.”49 Specifically, the court stated that it “would be a
Committee” had been appointed by the original trial judge for the case to assist in crafting
a remedy. However, the committee was composed of individuals heavily tied to the plaintiffs in the suit. See id. at 657 n.33.
44 See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (listing eight areas in which
each child educated in the system should develop to full capacity); see also Abbott ex rel.
Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998) (ordering implementation of full-day kindergarten and a half-day pre-school program as well as school-to-work and college-transition programs).
45 See RYAN, supra note 36, at 145 (providing a colorful description of school finance
litigation).
46 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 225 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (noting that the question whether
the “Assembly has responded adequately to its constitutional responsibility” is a political
question where “judicially manageable standards are lacking” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 226 (1962))); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 120 (Wash. 1978) (en
banc) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (“[Individuals] can write to their representatives or appear
before them and let their protests be heard. The court, however, is not so easy to reach
nor is it so easy to persuade that its judgment ought to be revised. A legislature may be a
hard horse to harness, but it is not quite the stubborn mule that a court can be.” (citation
omitted)); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 897 (Neely, J., dissenting) (noting that the political question doctrine appears to law students “that such deference to other authorities is more
cowardice . . . than . . . statesmanship” but that “maturity brings a recognition that all
power has its inherent limitations and . . . the majority has overstepped the limits of a
court”).
47 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (Ill. 1996).
48 Id. at 1188 (quoting Richard D. Ballot, Note, State Constitutional Law—Public School
Financing—Spending Disparity Between Wealthy School Districts and Poor Urban School Districts,
Caused by Reliance on Local Property Taxes, Is Violative of the “Thorough and Efficient Education”
Clause, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 445, 478 (1991)).
49 Id. at 1190.
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transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might
develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful
sense” since “the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy
involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise
of legislative and administrative discretion.”50 The court also expressed misgivings about deciding educational quality issues from the courtroom as it
would “deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter
which is close to the hearts of all individuals” and furthermore:
Judicial determination of the type of education children should receive and
how it can best be provided would depend on the opinions of whatever
expert witnesses the litigants might call to testify and whatever other evidence they might choose to present. Members of the general public, however, would be obliged to listen in respectful silence. We certainly do not
mean to trivialize the views of educators, school administrators and others
who have studied the problems which public schools confront. But nonexperts—students, parents, employers and others—also have important views
and experiences to contribute which are not easily reckoned through formal
judicial factfinding.51

Having analyzed the lack of manageable standards and evidentiary constraints for debating policy issues, the court issued a parting shot for other
courts that would still press forward in that the court refused “under the
guise of constitutional interpretation” to “presume to lay down guidelines or
ultimatums for [the legislature].”52
In another case, in Pennsylvania—where the state supreme court had
previously declared funding equity as essentially a political question53—the
intermediate appellate court was able to dismiss an adequacy claim with clear
precedent that the legislature has “responsibility for the maintenance and
support of the public school system” and as such, no court would “inquire
into the reason, wisdom, or expediency of the legislative policy with regard to
education” or “judicially define what constitutes an ‘adequate’ education or
what funds are ‘adequate’ to support such a program.”54 Likewise, in Florida, previous precedent favoring political questions provided a trial court
with the means to quickly dismiss an adequacy challenge that sought an equitable remedy to order that foster children receive special state-funded
tutors.55 The court noted that “adequacy”—as a term requiring equal education performance—was not in the Florida constitution, and as a result, any
further remedy was beyond the “province of [the] court.”56
50 Id. at 1191.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1192 (alteration in original) (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71, 128 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (Rosellini, J., dissenting)).
53 Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
54 Marrero ex rel. Tabales v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 965 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998).
55 Undereducated Foster Children of Fla. v. Fla. Senate, 700 So.2d 66, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (per curiam).
56 Id. at 67 & n.1.
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In conclusion, the contrast between approaches to education finance litigation is clear. Courts have either applied a political question approach in
some form to dismiss the case or attempted to find judicially enforceable
standards. Part II will compare the mechanics and outcomes of the state
education cases with federal segregation litigation.
II. LIMITING PRINCIPLES: COMPARING SCHOOL SEGREGATION
AND SCHOOL FINANCE
Several lessons can be gleaned from a comparison of school segregation
and finance cases. Both sets of cases show the approaches and limitations of
a court enforcing substantive constitutional guarantees when such rights are
connected to political questions. The policy concerns at play in these two
legal areas are integrated schools and the quality of education. As will be
explained, courts were forced to grapple with evidentiary issues, remedy
issues, standard of review issues, and issues of judicial restraint. The federal
segregation lawsuits, prior to the limitations of the U.S. Supreme Court, show
the difficulty of keeping remedies and litigation reasonably contained. Likewise, state courts that have permitted finance litigation have faced similar
problems limiting court remedies and stopping repeated litigation. In contrast, the political question doctrine, which informed later federal segregation cases and expressly dictated the holdings of some state finance cases,
creates more reliable barriers against courts entering areas where judicial talents are unsuited.57
When courts enter unfamiliar policy-based areas, procedural justifications and legal standards are insufficient to resolve the matter at hand. As a
result, courts are required to hear expert testimony and scientific evidence to
find the best outcome between the parties.58 However, when the adversarial
party is a school board or state, and the issue is education policy, the court in
essence is deciding the best outcome for the community, not just the parties,
based on this evidence.59 As previously noted, the Brown Court was thought
57 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 329–30 (2002) (discussing the
institutional weakness of courts relative to legislatures that can “better tap the flow of ideas
in the marketplace to reach their decisions”); see also id. at 335 (noting that in the absence
of the political question doctrine, courts are “left alone to police the boundaries of [their]
power”).
58 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (1972 proposed rules) (“An intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most common source of this
knowledge is the expert witness, although there are other techniques for supplying it.”).
59 See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (noting how
an education policy ruling will impact school administrators and teachers as well as students, parents, and employers unrepresented in the proceedings); see also Scott Birkey,
Note, Gordon v. Texas and the Prudential Approach to Political Questions, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
1265, 1276 (1999) (discussing a district court’s denial of jurisdiction as a political question
due to the “[s]ignificant scientific and economic studies” required to be conducted in
order to issue a ruling which in any case would have diverse policy impacts (quoting
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to have utilized social science evidence as a means to strengthen its legitimacy as it made a shift from merely demanding a strict enforcement of “separate but equal” to a holding that “separate but equal” is “inherently
unequal.”60 The Court’s evidentiary limitations are evident since this particular social science was later criticized from a scientific perspective.61 While
court holdings can last for decades, social science evidence may be ephemeral. This expert evidentiary issue in Brown is coupled with the federal
courts’ struggles to flesh out segregation remedies in later cases, where they
were compelled to rely on the parties to the case as found by the NAACP’s
impact on case outcomes and its shaping of remedies as noted particularly by
differences between stronger NAACP remedies and weaker State Department-negotiated remedies.62 Reliance on parties for the structure of remedies becomes disconcerting when, as is the case in policy questions, special
interests exert strong influence on the evidence and remedies.
The same evidentiary issues present in shaping the standards and the
remedies of segregation cases are paralleled in school finance cases, as will be
seen. To determine the definitions of state constitutional education provisions, which, for example, contain standards requiring an “adequate education,” courts have turned to disputable experts, rather than traditional
constitutional interpretation methods like legislative history.63 Since this litigation is driven by education reformers, there is no shortage of interest
groups exerting their influence and deploying experts, in turn naturally
requiring defendants to present their own countering experts. This battle of
the experts is now a standard part of litigating such claims, as noted in a
practitioner’s guide to handling school adequacy litigation.64 As the majority
in Edgar pointed out earlier, the competing positions of experts do not sufficiently account for the needs of all stakeholders.65 A legislature, at the least,
can take better account of these stakeholders than court selected experts
can.66 Moreover, in this education policy area, the adversarial system may
operate less than optimally as can occur in public policy settings. A school
district defendant (or even the state itself) and a non-profit defendant may
Gordon v. Texas, 965 F. Supp. 913, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1997), rev’d, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir.
1998))).
60 See generally Cohen & Weiss, supra note 13, at 72–92 (discussing interrelation of
social science research on race and education and its impact on legislative and judicial
decision making).
61 See Ely, supra note 12, at 217 n.9.
62 See Moss, supra note 17.
63 See Section I.B (noting particularly the variety of interpretations provided by experts
to the Rose court in determining an efficient education).
64 DODD, supra note 36, at 143 (“Practice Tip. While earlier cases frequently turned on
expert testimony concerning financial disparities, educational experts in the areas of educational skills, school facilities, and teacher adequacy now are pivotal.”).
65 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996).
66 See Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon Common Law
for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1169 (1982) (“There is still little basis for confidence that courts are especially competent surveyors of a legal topography.”).
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share their dislike of a statute or system. The binary adversarial system, when
confronted with the variable policy question of what an adequate education
is, may be deciding an issue where supposedly feuding sides have common
ground.67 Legal certitude then would simply become expert consensus as
judged by a court. If parties are truly adversarial, then the situation fares no
better, since judges would simply be picking a winner among various schools
of thought.68 Like judges deciding difficult segregation remedies, courts
here could use education experts and interest group submissions as proxies
to determine the content of an adequate education for everyone.
In addition to the troubling evidentiary issues, both segregation and
school finance cases share similar structural difficulties in standards. Prior to
Brown, courts checked if facts conformed to the comparative “separate but
equal” standard that asked if two areas were equal.69 In the post-Brown discrimination cases, rather than a comparative standard, courts sought a substantive goal of integration.70 In school finance, the gradual shift among
states from comparative school equity litigation to qualitative school adequacy litigation appears analogous to Brown’s shift in standard. Equity standards applied through an equal protection clause are comparative in nature
where judges can compare school districts in order to gauge educational
opportunity by funding.71 Unlike equity cases, education adequacy cases,
instead of comparing district funding, seek to achieve a substantive goal of
determining what constitutes a basic education.72 Both the results-oriented
67 See Jeremy Zeitlin, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Executives’ Discretion to Defend
Initiatives Amending the California Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 327, 340 n.87
(2011) (noting that “the imposition of unwilling government counsel . . . raises concerns
about inadequate advocacy” exemplified by United States Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
apathetically “defend[ing] in court, against his own political view, the constitutional validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments” (citation omitted)).
68 See Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have “Neutral” Rule 706
Experts?, 1998 DETROIT C.L. L. REV. 927, 956 (noting that no expert is definitively able to
present a neutral argument since to be “capable of being an expert must mean having
taken some position in regard to” one of many schools of thought (citation omitted)). As
the author later notes, “to the extent that our rhetoric of impartiality buries the realities of
bias, it contributes to the corruption of power.” Id. at 970 (quoting Patricia A. Cain, Good
and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945, 1949
(1988)).
69 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950) (finding that black and white
law schools were substantially unequal in the opportunities they provided and thus finding
an exclusion of a black student from the white school invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 14–15 (discussing the policy goal of the Brown
holding and the equitable remedies permitted to carry it out).
71 Hinojosa & Walters, supra note 34, at 600–01 (describing education equity claims
that link the policy goal of educational opportunity to the examination of spending disparity by school districts).
72 Id. at 602 (“[A]dequacy litigation . . . shifted the focus away from trying to equalize
the amount spent on each student and instead questioned the sufficiency of school funding for students based on educational need.”).
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standards applied to post-Brown segregation cases and school adequacy cases
presented difficult management issues. In the segregation cases, courts
struggled to flesh out what exactly the substantive standard of unitary integration required.73 Likewise in the education finance context, the more manageable equity standard required only evidence of comparative values while
the much more difficult substantive adequacy standard required expert evidence to flesh out the components of a basic constitutionally mandated
education.74
In the area of remedies, both early school segregation cases and school
adequacy cases proved extremely difficult to limit. To meet substantive integration goals, federal court equitable power expanded up to high-water
marks in both Milliken, where the district court sought to disband school districts on a statewide theory, and later in Jenkins, where a district court compelled the levying of taxes and the creation of magnet school districts.75 To
achieve educational adequacy, state courts have gone so far as to strike down
education systems; however, the high-water mark of judicial authority is not
yet certain in this area of law, since the litigation continues in many states.76
Finally, both segregation and school finance litigation share a commonality in that they seem to have no final resolution point. Since both areas of
law are so heavily tied to policy, standards requiring unitary integration or
educational adequacy essentially cannot be fully met without legislative
action and the correct policy to remedy the problems. So long as the
problems of segregation or underachieving schools exist, the litigation
exists.77 Milliken and Jenkins signaled a pullback of equitable power but did
73 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (“[W]ithout an interdistrict violation
and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict
remedy.”).
74 DODD, supra note 36, at 143 (“Practice Tip. While earlier cases frequently turned
on expert testimony concerning financial disparities, educational experts in the areas of
educational skills, school facilities, and teacher adequacy now are pivotal.”).
75 See supra text accompanying notes 19–24 (explaining the Jenkins and Milliken
opinions).
76 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he
result of our decision is that Kentucky’s entire system of common schools is unconstitutional. . . . This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all its parts and parcels.
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing and financing the system and
to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the creation of local school
districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department of Education to the Minimum
Foundation Program and Power Equalization Program. It covers school construction and
maintenance, teacher certification—the whole gamut of the common school system in
Kentucky.”).
77 See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1128 (“A court’s inability to achieve such unattainable
social change may result in the retention of jurisdiction over a structural reform case for
years, if not decades.”); see also Chip Jones, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can (and Should?)
Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction in School Desegregation Cases, 47 SMU L. REV. 1889, 1903 (1994)
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court held that a district court should ‘retain jurisdiction until it is
clear that disestablishment has been achieved’ and until the goal of ‘a desegregated, nonracially operated school system is rapidly and finally achieved.’” (quoting Rainey v. Bd. of
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not end integration litigation while school finance cases likewise continue
into the present day.
The shared problems of these cases—evidentiary issues, problems surrounding standards and remedies, and litigation that ultimately depends on
a substantive goal being met—all suggest the value of applying the political
question doctrine to dismiss the issue. The segregation cases did not
decrease because total integration was achieved. Rather, the Supreme Court
tightened standards, lessened the variety of remedies available, and generally
curbed the authority of federal courts. The Court more tightly defined the
de jure/de facto segregation and interdistrict remedy distinction.78 Remedies were likewise curtailed with Milliken effectively ending busing, while Jenkins halted a costly court-imposed magnet school plan, as noted above.79
Even though segregation cases were not halted by formal nonjusticiability
limits, political question concerns informed and motivated the analysis of the
majority opinions in Milliken and Jenkins, which narrowed old, broader segregation standards.80 Similarly for school finance cases, the San Antonio
Court’s dismissal was heavily informed by judicial competency concerns,81
while several state courts dismissed school finance litigation on political question grounds.
The problems of expanding court power, exemplified in the segregation
cases where courts were levying taxes and disbanding districts statewide, have
troubled school finance litigation today in states where it has not been dismissed as a political question. Vergara v. California and Texas Taxpayer and
Student Fairness Coalition v. Williams, two modern school finance cases, will
dominate the remaining discussion. As with the segregation cases of the past,
the finance cases of today share the same problems, which can be curbed by
the political question doctrine.
III. THE NEW FRONTIERS

IN

EDUCATION LITIGATION

Vergara v. California is the logical conclusion of a court accepting claims
on school quality, rather than dismissing the claims under the political question doctrine. Likewise, Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition v. WilEduc. 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968))); Barbara Grijalva, TUSD Paying Millions in Court Fees in
Desegregation Case, WORLDNOW (Sep 30, 2015, 9:57 PM), http://www.tucsonnewsnow.com/
story/30157784/tusd-paying-millions-in-court-fees-in-desegregation-case.
78 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (“[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict
effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.”); see also YUDOF
ET AL., supra note 20, at 440 (noting that in light of Jenkins, a “district court would have to
show that the programs would remedy only the effects that de jure segregation may have
had on achievement, separating out those effects from the effects of . . . de facto
segregation”).
79 See supra text accompanying notes 19–24 (explaining the Jenkins and Milliken
opinions).
80 See supra text accompanying notes 19–26 (describing the majority components of
each opinion invoking political question issues as well as Justice Thomas’s concurrence to
Jenkins).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 29–31 (describing the reasoning in San Antonio).
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liams shows the continued longevity and expansiveness of school finance
litigation generally. This Part provides background to Vergara and Williams,
while also discussing the current situation in some states that have applied
the political question doctrine and other states where the political question
doctrine application is a novel issue.
A.

Vergara: The Logical Conclusion of School Finance Litigation

Vergara and the other plaintiffs were school students who sued the state
of California as well as their individual school districts for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the state corpus of tenure laws composed of permanent employment statutes, last-in, first-out laws, and dismissal statutes.82 The
California permanent-employment statutes require a school district to give
teachers notice that they have not been “reelected” and hence tenured by
March 15 of the second year of employment, which gives a district less than
two years to decide whether to deny tenure.83 Dismissal statutes generally
describe the process and standards required to terminate a tenured
teacher.84 “Last in, first out” or LIFO statutes require that the last-hired
teacher must be the first fired teacher in the event of a layoff, with no exceptions or waivers possible for teacher effectiveness.85 The crux of the plaintiffs’ claim was that these statutes combine to tenure “grossly ineffective
teachers,” who are then disproportionately placed in “predominately lowincome and minority” schools.86 In effect, these teachers, so placed, negatively impact the quality of education that the state provides. Since the quality of student education was negatively impacted, the injurious legislation was
held to violate California’s equal protection clause. Thus, the court placed
itself in the position to assess the different statutes’ effect on education and
to examine if they cause “potential and/or unreasonable exposure” of
“grossly ineffective teachers” to students generally and to minority/low
income students particularly, finding for plaintiffs on both questions.87
The trial court first drew a lineage of its authority beginning with Brown
v. Board of Education, quoting both its overruling of racial inequality and its
famous trumpeting of the value of educational opportunity.88 After noting
Serrano, the court cited Butt v. State of California,89 which, in striking down an
82 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
83 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21; see also Michael Futterman, Teacher Tenure Laws Violate
California Constitution, 24 No. 8 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 8 (July 28, 2014).
84 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44934, 44938(b)(1)–(2), 44944; see Futterman, supra note 83.
85 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955; see Futterman, supra note 83.
86 Vergara, slip op. at 3.
87 Id. at 8 (noting that as a result of finding for plaintiffs defendants “bear[ ] the burden of establishing not only that [the state] has a compelling interest which justifies [the
challenged statutes] but that the distinctions drawn by the law[s] are necessary to further
[their] purpose” (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971) (alterations in
original))).
88 Id. at 1–2.
89 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL309.txt

2016]

unknown

the runaway wagon

Seq: 17

31-MAR-16

9:52

1241

early closing of schools due to a state budget shortfall, prohibited school
term length inequality. The court confirmed that previous courts had
addressed lack of equality based on the “discrete facts” of their cases; however,
this particular case required the trial judge to apply “constitutional principles
to the quality of the educational experience.”90 In order to adjudicate the
degree to which a statute impacts education quality, the court’s analysis naturally requires an assumption that a constitutionally protected level of education exists; thus the standard applied by the trial judge inclines toward one of
educational adequacy.
The effect of “grossly ineffective” teachers was established as “substantially undermin[ing] the ability of [children] to succeed in school” since it
was unchallenged by either side and supported by several studies.91 Also
without dispute, another expert testified to the percentage of ineffective
teachers, and from this number, the court computed the estimated number
of ineffective teachers operating in the state.92 Remarkably, the court was
able to find that grossly ineffective teachers would be harmful “as long as said
teachers hold their positions,”93 in essence leaving no possibility for
improvement.
In a separate analysis, the court found that the statutes posed a disproportionate effect on poor and minority students. A state report provided the
crux of the evidence, as it claimed that students attending “high-poverty, lowperforming schools” were more likely than wealthy students to “attend
schools having a disproportionate number of underqualified, inexperienced,
out-of-field, and ineffective teachers and administrators.”94 Since minorities
also disproportionately attend such schools, this is evidently enough to suggest a disparate impact. Evidence also suggested that the statutes created a
“churning” phenomenon where the teaching faculty is essentially a revolving
door of underqualified teachers.95
Moving to the challenged statutes, as an initial matter, the court said it
would only consider “evidence and law” rather than the “wisdom” of the statutes.96 The court characterized the two-year permanent employment statute
as a “misnomer” with “bizarre” effects, since notice of tenure must be given
90 Vergara, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original).
91 Id. at 7 (citing studies claiming that grossly ineffective teachers cost students both
$1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom and 9.54 months of learning in a single year
compared to students with average teachers).
92 Id. at 8 (citing expert testimony that “1–3% of teachers in California are grossly
ineffective” and that because there are “roughly 275,000 active teachers in this state, the
extrapolated number of grossly ineffective teachers ranges from 2,750 to 8,250”).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 15 (quoting CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EVALUATING PROGRESS
TOWARD EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE EDUCATORS 5 (2007)).
95 Id. at 15. The churning effect is referred to as the “Dance of the Lemons.” For a
description of this phenomenon, see Dance of the Lemons, ECONOMIST (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21599005-reformers-want-make-it-easiersack-bad-teachers-dance-lemons.
96 Vergara, slip op. at 5.
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by March, thus necessitating evaluation even earlier—before the concurrent
two-year new teacher credentialing program.97 A defense expert provided
support to the proposition that the statute did not provide “nearly enough
time for an informed decision to be made regarding the decision of tenure,”
while two other defense experts stated that three to five years would be a
better time frame.98 In response, the court found that the statute failed strict
scrutiny as teachers could be tenured who otherwise would not be, while
teachers who presented the slightest doubt as to their ability were denied
tenure even if they could potentially improve.99 Yet, while California’s statutes admittedly provided generous tenure grants, the state is by no means
alone in its provisions when compared with other state governments.100
The dismissal statutes fared no better, as evidence suggested that dismissal cases could take “two to almost ten years and cost $50,000 to $450,000” to
conclude, thus leading officials to simply not prosecute cases.101 As another
defense witness documented the extreme difficulty of dismissal, the court
refuted arguments of due process by finding that the statutes provided
“uber” due process that is “so complex, time consuming and expensive as to
make an effective, efficient yet fair dismissal of a grossly ineffective teacher
illusory.”102 This finding was made in light of evidence that “teachers themselves do not want grossly ineffective colleagues in the classroom.”103
The court likewise struck down the LIFO statute, but not before making
some noteworthy findings. The court was centrally appalled by the statute’s
lack of an exception for teacher effectiveness, and colorfully commented on
the logic of the circumstances:
No matter how gifted the junior teacher, and no matter how grossly ineffective the senior teacher, the junior gifted one, who all parties agree is creating
a positive atmosphere for his/her students, is separated from them and a
senior grossly ineffective one, who all parties agree is harming the students
entrusted to her/him, is left in place. . . . Distilled to its basics, the State
Defendants’/Intervenors’ position requires them to defend the proposition
that the state has a compelling interest in the de facto separation of students
from competent teachers, and a like interest in the de facto retention of
incompetent ones.104

Naturally, the court found this logic to be insufficient for strict scrutiny.
However, the court stayed its injunctions against the enforcement of the stat97 Id. at 9.
98 Id. at 9–10.
99 Id.
100 See id. at 14 (“[O]nly 10 states, including California, provide that seniority is the sole
factor, or one that must be considered.”). Likewise, “California is one of only five outlier
states with a period of two years or less.” Id. at 10.
101 Id. at 11 (“LAUSD alone had 350 grossly ineffective teachers it wished to dismiss at
the time of trial regarding whom the dismissal process had not yet been initiated.”).
102 Id. at 13.
103 Id. at 12.
104 Id. at 13–14.
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utes, pending appeal.105 Overall, Vergara represents a new height of judicial
oversight of the legislature, where employment laws can be pulled into the
strict scrutiny of the judiciary by their connection to education. This outcome is the result of not imposing the political question doctrine, and
instead permitting school finance litigation in a jurisdiction over a long
period of time.
B.

The Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition v.
Williams Case Longevity

Texas’s financial litigation has been extensively documented for its
extended period of legislative and judicial sparring.106 Its most recent chapter, The Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition v. Williams,107 represents
the continuing struggle. In brief, the bulk of the challenge stemmed from
declining legislative funding to education and was based on adequacy claims,
qualitative efficiency claims, and suitability claims.108
The string of litigation associated with this particular case resulted in
“hearing from over eighty live witnesses and building a record containing
over 5,000 admitted exhibits” with an intervening legislative action causing a
rehearing containing “another twelve live witnesses and . . . an additional 700
exhibits.”109 Moreover, the plaintiffs and intervenors were a large coalition
of school districts, charter schools, and interest groups suing the state. The
final opinion itself is over 200 pages in length.
The court found for the plaintiffs on the adequacy and suitability claims,
while it did not find a violation for the efficiency claims. The variety of issues
the court investigated in the adequacy claim indicates of the scope of its
authority under the cause of action. The court examined the ethnic and
economic composition of state schools and identified education and wealth
gaps, which if unaddressed—as testified by experts—would result in a “stark
future” of “declining income, higher rates of poverty, reduced consumer
spending, reduced tax revenues, and higher state expenditures.”110 By previous school finance precedent, state courts in Texas could find a constitutional violation if legislative goals for schools were not met with sufficient
105 Id. at 14.
106 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that the Texas Supreme Court
alone has issued four opinions on the issue).
107 No. D-1-GN-11-003130 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014).
108 See id., slip op. at 1–2. The adequacy claim in question is derived from a state constitutional clause requiring “general diffusion of knowledge” interpreted as “requiring the
Legislature to ensure that school districts are reasonably able to provide all students with a
meaningful opportunity to learn the essential knowledge and skills reflected in the state
curriculum such that upon graduation, students are prepared to continue to learn in postsecondary educational, training, or employment settings.” Id. at 1. Qualitative efficiency
requires a public education system to be productive of results with little waste, while Suitability requires “the school finance system to be structured, operated, and funded so it can
accomplish a general diffusion of knowledge for all Texas children.” Id. at 1–2.
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id. at 4.
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legislative resources and support.111 The court—detailing that while education standards have risen, the legislature had made cuts to specific education
related grants—found that these education cuts posed a particular risk to an
“at-risk” student population.112 The primary evidence used by the court to
arrive at this determination consisted of standardized test passage rates.113
As a result of lacking additional resources, school districts would be unable to
improve their performance using the principal strategies listed by the court:
(1) smaller class sizes, particularly in the early grades, (2) full-day quality
pre-K programs, (3) more competitive teacher salaries to improve the hiring
and retention of quality teachers, (4) instructional coaches, (5) tutors, and
(6) extended day and summer school programs. . . . In the absence of state
funds, districts have had to increase local tax rates and use revenues that are
supposed to provide districts with meaningful discretion in order to provide
for an adequate education—or, worse yet, to go without these programs
entirely.114

Evidence presenting cuts by school districts to these listed programs was
likewise indicative—according to the court—of insufficient legislative support, and therefore, a constitutional violation.115 In turn, the court concluded that current legislative monetary support is unconstitutionally
“arbitrary” and “inadequate,” and constitutional adequacy requires a “substantial investment of additional resources” in the form of a specific tax levy
available “without being made subject to a vote in a special election; otherwise local taxpayers can deprive local students access to the constitutionally
required level of education.”116
Likewise, the court granted relief for the plaintiffs’ suitability claims
where the means the legislature had chosen to educate students was declared
insufficient. Again, student performance evidence was utilized to declare the
legislative means unconstitutional.117 The legislative program and funding
regiment was again declared outdated, poorly designed, and insufficiently
funded.118 The court was particularly persuaded by the legislature’s failure
to comply with funding amounts recommended by an interest group: the
111 Id. For the previous precedent, see Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent
School District, 176 S.W.3d 746, 785 (Tex. 2005) (“It would be arbitrary . . . for the Legislature to define the goals for accomplishing the constitutionally required general diffusion
of knowledge, and then to provide insufficient means for achieving those goals.”).
112 Williams, slip op. at 4.
113 Id. at 5 (“Despite the roll-out of tougher academic requirements and the dismal
performance results, neither the Legislature nor the Texas Education Agency has made
any effort to determine the costs of meeting increasing standards and providing remediation to struggling students.”).
114 Id. at 6.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 6–7.
117 Id. at 9 (noting evidence of “hundreds of thousands of high school students who are
off-track for graduation, the low levels of college readiness, and the substantial performance gaps (especially for economically disadvantaged and ELL students)”).
118 Id.
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“School Finance Working Group composed of members of nearly every educational organization in Texas.”119
The constitutional efficiency requirement was found not to be violated,
mostly due to overreaching by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs demanded that
efficiency required new legislative actions, including: “eliminating the statutory cap on charter schools; changing laws, regulations, and practices that
govern teacher compensation, hiring, firing, and certification; creating
greater school choice or vouchers; and modifying school district financial
reporting requirements,” as a “better” means to achieve efficiency.120 To
rule for the plaintiffs, the court viewed, would be “judicial interference in
specific questions of education policy.”121
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the court enjoined the State from “giving any
force or effect to the sections of the Education Code relating to the financing
of public school education”; however, it stayed its injunction to give the legislature time to address the situation.122 Ultimately, Williams is an example of
a mature school finance litigation state. The amount of complexity, expense,
and judicial oversight of the legislature is staggering.
C.

Current Courts Adjudicating or Dismissing Political Questions

Three jurisdictions referenced earlier—Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Florida—have previously dismissed state education adequacy claims based on the
political question doctrine.123 Searches for current school finance litigation
in those jurisdictions revealed no recent published trial orders or court opinions referencing constitutional claims based on educational adequacy, except
in Pennsylvania.124 One recent Pennsylvania case referenced the state’s education clause, establishing that unlike the environmental constitutional provision at hand in the case, Pennsylvania’s education clause lacked any
“judicially manageable standard for determining whether the Legislature’s
enactment of [the challenged statute] resulted in a failure to provide for a
‘thorough and efficient system of public education.’”125 More on point,
recently Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court succinctly announced
that claims seeking to invalidate state school funding as insufficient to meet
119 Id.
120 Id. at 12–13.
121 Id. at 13.
122 Id.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 47–56.
124 Searches were conducted either for cases featuring educational finance claims or
language of the respective state’s education amendment within the last three years.
125 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, No. 228 M.D. 2012, 2013 WL 3942086, at
*13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013) (quoting Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, 805 A.2d 476, 490–91 (Pa. 2002)); id. (“Further, the challenge at
issue impermissibly raised questions concerning the soundness of the policy set forth by
the Legislature. For these reasons, the Court held the political question doctrine barred
[the] challenge.”).
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education standards presented nonjusticiable political questions.126 In brief,
the court said that it could
no more determine what level of annual funding would be sufficient for
each student in each district in the statewide system to achieve the required
proficiencies than the Supreme Court was able to determine what constitutes an ‘adequate’ education or what level of funding would be ‘adequate’
for each student in such a system.127

Applying the political question approach to school finance claims
remains a live issue. In a recent Iowa case, parents and students sued the
state for having “failed to establish standards, failed to enforce any standards,
failed to adopt effective educator pay systems, and failed to establish and
maintain an adequate education delivery system,” in accordance with a state
constitutional provision on education.128 Although the court ultimately did
not dismiss the case as a political question—since it could dismiss the claim
on another ground—it would lay out a strong case to declare the question
nonjusticiable in the future. Drawing on the criteria from Baker v. Carr, the
court found that the specific reference to the state legislature in each relevant constitutional section suggested a commitment of authority to it.129 Furthermore, the Court suggested that standards like “moral improvement”
were not manageable and that the court might be compelled to make an
initial policy judgment when entering the “longstanding debate over the
merits of state mandates versus local control in public education.”130 Lastly,
the court was influenced by a persuasive Indiana case that found the issue to
be a political question.131
However, another court in Kansas recently directly addressed the justiciability issue for various school finance claims from a massive class action—
with a class composed of school districts, students, and teachers—against the
state. The court discussed justiciability in detail and ultimately found all
questions justiciable and remanded on the adequacy claim for application of
a standard akin to that applied in Rose.132
126 William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 114 A.3d 456, 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015).
127 Id. at 463. The case is currently on appeal. See Karen Langley, Pennsylvania’s School
Funding Dispute Headed to State’s High Court, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (April 21, 2015),
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2015/04/21/Court-dismisses-lawsuit-claimingPa/stories/201504210172.
128 King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Iowa 2012). The relevant state constitutional provision reads: “The General Assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion
of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.” Id. at 12 (emphasis
removed) (quoting IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2nd, § 3).
129 Id. at 17–18.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 18–19 (discussing Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518,
520–22 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Nagy ex rel. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844
N.E.2d 481, 491 (Ind. 2006))).
132 Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1203 (Kan. 2014) (“[T]he adequacy requirement is
met when the public education financing system provided by the legislature for grades
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Mainly, the court analyzed two Baker factors: the “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” to the legislative branch and a lack of “manageable” judicial standards to resolve the issue.133 For both factors, the court
noted that a “clear majority” of state courts have ruled in favor of justiciability.134 The court, throughout its opinion, was heavily influenced by
the Texas Supreme Court, which, as noted above, also rejected political question analysis. In first determining whether there was a constitutional commitment, the court said that although the relevant constitutional sections
specifically name the legislative branch as the controlling party, a responsibility for the judiciary can nonetheless be presumed since the relevant section
did not specify the legislature’s discretion as “absolute.”135 Rather, the use of
“shall” rather than “may” imposed a “mandatory constitutional dut[y]” that
“envisions something more than funding public schools by legislative fiat.”136
In considering manageable standards, the modifiers in the clause, such as
efficient, uniform, or (in this case) suitable, provided a standard implying
court participation.137 For the standard of “suitability” in particular, the
court stated that “[t]he judiciary is well accustomed to applying substantive
standards the crux of which is reasonableness.”138 Furthermore, suitability is
composed of “minimum requirements of adequacy and equity” where the
court function is to ask if the legislature has “performed its duty.”139 The
court continued its discussion by noting the frequent judicial duty to
“defin[e] and apply[ ] various, perhaps imprecise, constitutional standards.”140 Ultimately, the court saw the standard applying if the legislative
fund is “so low” that it was not a “suitable provision” for state education.141
The court concluded by moving forward to the merits, as it was in its power
alone to “apply, interpret, define, and construe all words, phrases, sentences
and sections” in the state constitution.142
These cases provide the most recent additions to the corpus of school
adequacy law. The selections provide examples of states with no political
question restraints, states applying the political question doctrine, and states
currently addressing the political question doctrine as a novel matter. The
K–12 . . . is reasonably calculated to have all Kansas public education students meet or
exceed the standards set out in Rose.”).
133 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
134 Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1219. In particular, the court notes that many other state
courts have rendered the question nonjusticiable for constitutions less clear than their
own. Id. at 1226; cf., e.g., Coal. for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So.2d 400, 406–07 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981).
135 Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1220 (citing Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005)).
136 Id. at 1221.
137 Id. at 1225.
138 Id. (citing Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 778).
139 Id. at 1226 (emphasis removed).
140 Id. at 1228.
141 Id. (quoting Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 235 (Kan. 2003)).
142 Id. at 1231 (quoting Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923, 930 (Kan. 2005)).
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succinct dismissal and dearth of any adequacy claims from states that have
accepted the application of the political question are especially notable. The
comparative analysis of these cases, both against each other and in light of
the material from the previous section, is discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE BURDENS

OF

REJECTING

THE

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

Like the cases described in Part I, the recent cases in school adequacy
reveal problems with evidence, standards of review, remedies, and limits on
the judiciary. Additionally, the fact that these problems have emerged in litigation suggests that courts have indeed accepted a political question for adjudication. The cases of Williams and Vergara each progressed without the
political question doctrine limiting their courts’ authority.
An indication that Vergara’s claim at heart was a political question begins
with the evidence. Critical evidence in the case was based on education policy and promulgated by experts and government offices.143 Topics in the
evidence range from measuring effects of teacher quality upon student
achievement to the impact of tenure statutes on teacher quality. These are
normal and acceptable discussion topics within a legislature where there is a
broad range of views. However, in a courtroom, the evidence presented is
limited to experts who are selected by litigants. Potentially radical changes to
legislative education policy may be made by one judge who is relying on
whatever evidence is present. As an old legal axiom144 similarly relates,
applied here to the segregation cases, when scientific evidence is used to buttress a legal argument, the fallibility of the evidence can make bad law.145
Additionally, the limits of the adversarial method were exemplified in Vergara. Much of the persuasive and critical evidence was undisputed here. The
court was quick to point out, perhaps in an effort to boost credibility, that
defense experts supported viewpoints hostile to their side.146 Critically, however, when a court permits political questions to enter the courtroom, governments and interest groups who agree on the issues can short-circuit a
legislature by having a law struck down in court. As a result of these evidentiary problems in Vergara, debatable theories on the effects of tenure policy
and teacher quality are now correct in the eyes of the law. In truth, the
employment statutes in question only may create firing difficulties and may
result in more grossly negligent teachers working in low-income areas. The
heart of the matter is that limits of courtroom evidence combined with the
143 See supra text accompanying notes 91–95 (examining the evidence sources in
Vergara).
144 See supra note 7 (stating the axiom that cases considered “great” are often “bad law”
since their judgments were distorted by emotions).
145 See Ely, supra note 12, at 217 n.9 (casting doubt on the science supporting Brown v.
Board of Education). In short, just as legal judgments driven by changing emotions can twist
the law, a ruling driven by fluid science may likewise be distorting.
146 See supra text accompanying notes, 91, 92, 98, 102 (citing situations in Vergara where
the court noted defense experts provided support for the plaintiff or where the defense
left plaintiff’s assertions unchallenged).
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finality of court decisions is a critical problem when addressing questions that
are political in nature. One solution to the limits of evidence is to simply
receive a large quantity of information. Williams contains a multitude of evidence, such that it practically looks like a legislative report.147 However,
regardless of the amount of information and number of interveners, courts
are still limited by the adversarial system and the rules of evidence that are
invariably less representative of societal opinion than a legislature. After all,
the Williams court was still heavily influenced by education requirements
promulgated by interest groups.148 Additionally, the fact that the Williams
court was required to receive such a volume of policy information suggests
that the adjudicated claims are indeed political questions since this behavior
relates more to that of a legislature rather than the judiciary.
The standards of review and their applications also suggest that the questions adjudged here are political. The ruling in Gannon is not uncommon in
that it claimed “suitability” would be a sufficient standard grounded in “reasonableness.”149 Unfortunately, in cases of political questions, soft standards
can be stretched under the pressure of interest groups and political crises.
The standard in Vergara, apparently based on the state equal protection
clause, now analyzes education quality and judges with strict scrutiny any laws
that are harmful to any court’s perception of education quality. A large
range of statutes, from funding adjustments to building regulations, which
may have deleterious effects on education, may now be examined with strict
scrutiny. Balancing the benefits and burdens of legislative policy is difficult
under the unforgiving test of strict scrutiny. Gannon’s court has attempted to
control the suitability standard by cordoning its effect to when state education funding is too low.150 However, even that limit proves insufficient to
keep courts above the political fray. For example, the Williams court, in
preventing low funding, still behaved like a legislature where budget cuts to
education were struck down based on performance scores of students and
recommended funding levels from interest groups.151 The lineage of case
law preceding Vergara began with a seemingly stable equitable standard concerned purely with comparative funding. However, following Vergara, the
147 Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130, slip op.
at 1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014) (citing the thousands of exhibits and multitudes of
evidence in the case).
148 See supra text accompanying note 119 (citing the influence of the School Finance
Working Group).
149 Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1225 (Kan. 2014).
150 Id. at 1228 (quoting Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 235 (Kan. 2003)).
151 See supra text accompanying note 119 (citing the influence of the School Finance
Working Group); see also William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform
Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789, 809 (2010) (“[I]n amassing expertise and continuously monitoring the behavior of the primary reform actors, the Kentucky legislature
might be coming to resemble nothing so much as the ideal activist court . . . .” (citing
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 263
(2003))).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL309.txt

1250

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

31-MAR-16

9:52

[vol. 91:3

standard is now a substantive examination of general harm to education.
When courts take on political questions, standards—which are already soft to
begin with—are not stable or judicially manageable.
The “Runaway Remedy Problem” of political questions in courts is
closely tied to the need to find limits on court power. Cases where political
questions are adjudicated soon result in legislative-like remedies in scope and
size. The segregation cases found courts striking down school district boundaries statewide and levying taxes until the U.S. Supreme Court, influenced by
political question concerns, intervened and began to curb court power.152
The Rose court struck down an entire education system and replaced it with
its own promulgated guidelines.153 Vergara and Williams are cases where no
political question restraint has yet been employed, and as a result, they are
proceeding down the same road as the segregation and Rose-type cases. After
Vergara, besides striking down the entire teacher employment regime as
harmful to education,154 many laws in the state may now likewise fall under
judicial oversight due to possible deleterious effects on education. Under
Williams, the Texas assembly is locked into a certain funding level by the
judiciary now. The political question doctrine was designed to avoid these
sorts of rulings. Vergara and others like it are the direct result of a failure to
apply the political question doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Some questions are political by nature, regardless of whether a court has
properly dismissed them or not. Four factors have been presented in order
to examine if a case is political. If a court uses an extremely flexible standard, evidence that is heavily policy-based, remedies that continue to grow,
or no clear judicial limits, the court may likely be answering a political question. In particular, if the evidence is as vast as the content of legislative
debates and if the remedies seem to be actions normally taken by a legislature, then a court may have accepted political questions for adjudication. It
is necessary to state that this Note was limited to education cases, but these
cases are instructive in showing what may occur when courts attempt to
answer political questions generally.
In order to cure the malady of conflicts and endless lawsuits plaguing
school adequacy litigation states, courts must take an approach that is influenced by the political question doctrine. Courts that have taken the
medicine of the political question approach are no longer faced with
repeated education claims pushed by persistent interest groups. However, in
jurisdictions where school adequacy litigation thrives, having already interpreted their state constitutions to permit the litigation, it is unlikely that
courts can simply dismiss claims as political questions. Courts may take the
approach of the segregation cases, though, and simply allow their subsequent
152
153
154

Section I.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 38–43 (describing the details of the Rose case).
See Section III.A (describing the Vergara court’s reasoning in detail).
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opinions to be informed by the political question doctrine as they curtail
excessive remedies or tighten particular standards. This is the pathway out of
the morass of making policy from the judge’s bench. This is how to regain
control of the runaway wagon of school adequacy litigation. Vergara and
cases like it have shown the effects of judges bringing political questions into
the courtroom. With large swaths of teacher employment litigation being
struck down in court-ordered remedies, employing a robust political question doctrine could not be more important. Without some careful reliance
on the political question doctrine, states like Kansas, which have just begun
school adequacy litigation, will wind up with remedies like Vergara.
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